Background: Healthcare workers are thought to play a role in nosocomial transmission of norovirus, but the level and direction of norovirus transmission between patients and healthcare workers in sustaining transmission during an outbreak have not been quantified. Methods: We developed a method for finding plausible transmission trees of who acquired their infection from whom. We applied the method to data from an outbreak of norovirus in 4 wards of a psychiatric institution in the Netherlands in 2008. The simulated transmission trees were based on serial intervals for time between symptom onsets, weighted for the number of days that healthcare workers were present. The obtained transmission trees were linked to the Barthel Index, a measure of patient reliance on healthcare in their basic daily activities. Results: The dominant recognized transmission route was from patient to patient (64%), followed by patient to healthcare worker (29%). The overall estimated reproduction number for healthcare workers was low compared with patients (0.25 vs. 1.20; mean difference ϭ 0.95 ͓95% confidence interval (CI) ϭ 0.60 to 1.30͔). The average number of all subsequent cases attributable to the downstream branch of one single infected healthcare worker in the transmission tree was 4.4 compared with 6.5 for cases attributable to one single infected patient (mean difference ϭ 2.1 ͓95% CI ϭ Ϫ4.7 to 8.9͔). In the ward with patients requiring the highest level of care from healthcare workers, the attack rate among healthcare workers was highest. Conclusion: This approach provides a framework to quantify the magnitude and direction of transmission between healthcare workers and patients during a norovirus outbreak. The utility of this method in outbreaks of other infections and in different settings should be explored.
N orovirus is the most common cause of acute gastroenteritis worldwide. 1, 2 In persons with underlying illness, norovirus infection can cause serious complications, such as dehydration 3 or even death. 4 There is no antiviral treatment and no vaccine, although there are vaccines in development. [5] [6] [7] Transmission of norovirus occurs predominantly through fecal-oral contact, but vomiting can also play a role. 8, 9 Norovirus can easily be transmitted from person to person because of its low infectious dose, 10 its ability to survive on surfaces for a long time, 11 and limited immunity after natural infection, 1 as well as because noroviruses evolve rapidly into new antigenic variants. [12] [13] [14] The effective reproduction number of norovirus is therefore high; any case is likely to infect several other susceptibles. 15 Many reported norovirus outbreaks are in settings where clusters of vulnerable persons live close together, such as nursing homes, 16, 17 hospitals, 18 and psychiatric institutions. 4 These outbreaks can be linked to excess mortality. 19 However, the effectiveness of different control measures is unknown. 20 This is partly because little is known about the relative importance of the direction of norovirus transmission between patients and healthcare workers in sustaining transmission. The role of healthcare workers in disease transmission between patients was first shown-controversially at the time-by Semmelweis in 1847. 21 He showed that the mortality rate from puerperal fever was much higher in a labor ward where delivery was performed by medical students compared with a ward run by midwifery students. The mortality rate fell after the introduction of hand washing with antiseptic solution in the medical student ward. More recently, studies of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) have also shown that healthcare workers can play a role in transmission. [22] [23] [24] The effective reproduction number quantifies the amount of transmission of an infection and can be inferred from the epidemic curve of an outbreak. 15, [25] [26] [27] However, the average reproduction number does not show the direction of transmission between healthcare workers and patients. To overcome this problem, we extended previous work 15 by developing a method to reconstruct plausible transmission trees of who acquired their infection from whom. This study shows application of the new method to an outbreak of norovirus in 4 wards of a psychiatric institution in the Netherlands in 2008.
METHODS

Summary of Outbreak
An outbreak of norovirus occurred after a pilgrimage by some staff and patients from a Dutch psychiatric institution to Lourdes, France, in October 2008. This outbreak has been described in detail, 4 which allows us to reconstruct and study the norovirus transmission trees. We studied the cohort of people living in a separate high-dependency unit within the institution, where patients had somatic conditions in addition to psychiatric disorders. The building consists of 4 wards on one floor, 2 in the south wing (A-B) and 2 in the north wing (C-D), and an area between the wings where patients from all wards can meet and which has a shared smoking area.
For all patient cases, the date of symptom onset, smoking status, ward, and Barthel Index were recorded. The Barthel Index is a scale, comprising 10 variables that measure performance in activities of daily living and mobility. The index ranges from 0 to 20 (0 meaning the highest level of dependence). 28 This score was used as a proxy for the intensity of contacts between patients and healthcare workers. The Barthel Index was retrospectively assessed based on the patients' usual condition. For 3 patients, the Barthel Index was unknown; 2 from ward D (one case and one noncase) and the index case. The index case was not a resident of the building but developed norovirus symptoms on the way back from the pilgrimage and was admitted to ward B upon arrival. In all analyses, this case was treated as an inhabitant of ward B. For healthcare workers cases, the date of symptom onset (whether at work or not) and dates of absence were collected. Work schedules were used to determine when and on which ward healthcare workers were working during the outbreak period. Smoking status was not assessed, and it was unclear whether healthcare workers shared the smoking area with patients.
Control measures during the outbreak were retrospectively extracted from a log file kept by the staff and the Municipal Health Service. On the first 9 outbreak days, there were no control measures. On day 10, the following control measures were implemented simultaneously in all 4 wards until the end of the outbreak: all social activities were cancelled to limit patient-to-patient transmission and health-care workers were instructed to wear gloves to limit healthcare-workers-to-patient transmission. Healthcare workers were also instructed to limit cross-contact between wards, although this could not always be achieved, especially during night shifts. On day 27, wards B to D were thoroughly disinfected and isolated from ward A. 4
Construction of Transmission Trees
The construction of transmission trees extends earlier work on the estimation of the time course of reproduction numbers from sets of transmission matrices. 15 Details on how to construct a transmission tree are described in the eAppendix (section A1, http://links.lww.com/EDE/A551) and summarized below.
First, we constructed a transmission matrix by calculating serial intervals (the duration in days between the dates of symptom onset) for any pair of cases. These observed serial intervals were translated into a likelihood that transmission occurred between any pair of cases using the frequency distribution of serial intervals. In agreement with an earlier study 15 in which the serial interval was fitted to observed outbreak data, we assumed the serial interval to be gamma-distributed with shape parameter 3.3 and scale parameter 1.1, resulting in an average serial interval of 3.6 days. This likelihood function for transmission between any pair of cases can be used to estimate the transmission matrix M, with elements m ij representing the probability that a person with symptom onset at time t i was infected by a person with symptom onset at time t j .
Second, this transmission matrix is translated into a transmission tree. The most likely (maximum likelihood) tree can be found by setting, for every row i, the j with the highest transmission probability (max(m i,j )) to 1 and all others to zero. In case of a tie (subsets of equal max(m i,j )), a random j is chosen from the m i,j candidates. We then extracted a list of who acquired their infection from whom (ie, every combination of i and j where the elements of the maximum likelihood matrix equals 1). The transmission tree is a graphical illustration of the list, which consists of cases (nodes in the tree) and transmission events between cases (links between nodes in the tree).
Estimates of the transmission matrix were obtained using Markov chain Monte Carlo methods, generating a large random sample of transmission. We generated 2 independent sets of 250,000 transmission matrices and, after the first 3600 iterations, we used every 400th generated matrix, resulting in a total of 1232 plausible transmission matrices.
Information about transmission contacts can easily be added to the estimation procedure by weighting the transmission probabilities between pairs of cases in a matrix of the same dimension as the transmission matrix. 15 We added 2 types of weights. The first set of factors weighted contacts between patients and healthcare workers within and between wards, according to usual practice. The values, based on an assessment of time usage, were decided by agreement between investigators prior to the analyses (eAppendix, section A2 and eTable 1 and 2, http://links.lww.com/EDE/A551). In brief, for both patients and healthcare workers, contacts within wards were more frequent than between wards; the transmission probability was therefore assigned a weight of 1 for pairs of cases from the same ward and 0.2 for pairs of cases from different wards. Patients from all wards who smoked met in the designated smoking area, and therefore the probability of transmission between pairs of smokers from different wards was assigned a weight of 0.5 instead of 0.2. Contacts between patients and healthcare workers in the neighboring ward in the same wing were given a weight of 0.6. Sensitivity analyses confirmed that the outcomes were not influenced strongly by these assumptions.
The second type of weighting accounted for the influence of the healthcare workers' work schedule. For every pair of cases consisting of a patient and a healthcare worker (or 2 healthcare workers), the number of days that the healthcare worker had worked during their serial interval was calculated (effective working days). The likelihood of transmission was then weighted by a factor equal to the number of effective working days divided by the serial interval, regardless of which of those days the healthcare worker actually worked. 29 The influence of weighting was compared with an analysis assuming uniform weights (ie, assigning a weight of 1 to any pair of cases). A sensitivity analysis was performed to study the influence of the work schedule and various weight assumptions on the outcome measures.
Analyses
This method produced a series of possible transmission trees, allowing various statistics to be calculated. First, we estimated the contributions of the 4 transmission routes (patient to patient, patient to healthcare worker, healthcare worker to patient, and healthcare worker to healthcare worker) by dividing the number of edges for every transmission route by all edges in the tree.
The reproduction number for patients was calculated by counting secondary cases (ie, the numbers of patient-topatient or patient-to-healthcare-worker pairs) divided by the total number of infected patients. Similarly, the reproduction number for healthcare workers was calculated by adding numbers of healthcare-worker-to-healthcare-worker and healthcare-worker-to-patient pairs, divided by all infected healthcare workers. To obtain the reproduction number for every Barthel Index, we linked the Barthel Index to every patient in the transmission tree; we then counted, for every Barthel Index, the number of patient-to-patient and patientto-healthcare-worker pairs and divided this by the total number of infected patients who had this Barthel Index. Linear regression was used to examine the association between the reproduction number and the Barthel Index over all generated trees.
To express the contribution of each individual in the tree, we calculated the size of the downstream branch that each person generated, which we designate as attributable cases. Because the number of attributable cases depends on the cases' time of symptom onset, for this statistic we focused mainly on the first part of the outbreak (up to day 16).
All statistics were calculated over the generated Monte Carlo sample of transmission trees for analyses with and without weighting factors. Quantiles (0.025 and 0.975) were obtained for statistics as 95% predictive intervals (PI). Differences between healthcare workers and patients were assessed by calculating, for every generated transmission tree, the difference in means between patients and healthcare workers, with 95% confidence intervals (CI) of the difference. All analyses were performed using Mathematica (Wolfram Research, Inc., 2008). The data is provided in the eAppendix (eTable 3, http://links.lww.com/EDE/A551).
RESULTS
Overall, 46 cases of norovirus were identified; 13 healthcare workers and 33 patients (Fig. 1 ). The outbreak lasted 33 days, and there was a period of 4 days with no new cases. There are no epidemiologic data to suggest how the 2 halves of the outbreak were linked. However, the plausible transmission tree (Fig. 2) shows that the case infected on day 14 may have infected 2 new cases in the same ward, triggering a second wave of norovirus transmission. Based on the simulated set of transmission trees, there were several modes of introduction of norovirus into uninfected wards. Most transmission between wards seemed to be patient to patient, but there was also likely introduction of norovirus into a ward by an infected healthcare worker. Unobserved asymptomatic transmission may also have led to introduction of norovirus into uninfected wards.
The contributions of various transmission routes to the overall transmission for the 4 kinds of contacts ( Fig. 3) were calculated. If uniform weights were assigned to contacts between healthcare workers and patients (unweighted analysis), the dominant transmission route in the simulated transmission trees was from patient to patient (median ϭ 56% of all transmission contacts ͓95% PI ϭ 44 to 65͔). In the weighted analysis, even more of the transmission was between patients (median ϭ 64% ͓95% PI ϭ 57 to 70); the estimated transmissions from healthcare worker to patient or to another healthcare worker were much lower (7% in the weighted analyses vs. 21% in the unweighted analyses). Transmission from patient to healthcare worker was similar in both analyses (23% in the unweighted analyses vs. 29% in the weighted analyses).
The overall attack rate of norovirus in this outbreak was 42% ( Table 1) . Attack rates in the 4 wards were highly variable. The highest attack rate among healthcare workers was observed in the ward where the average Barthel Index Epidemiology • Volume 23, Number 2, March 2012
Quantifying Norovirus Transmission was lowest (ie, patients are more dependent on healthcare workers), and the attack rate among patients was highest in wards with a higher average Barthel Index. The percentage of smokers in each ward was similar and did not explain the observed differences in attack rates between wards. At lower Barthel Index scores, the predicted average reproduction numbers are slightly higher for both patient-to-patient and patient-to-healthcare-worker transmission (Fig. 4) . Although the predicted slope is slightly negative, the variance in predicted reproduction numbers for individual cases is much larger than the effect of the Barthel Index. The slopes of the 2 lines were similar, indicating that the influence of the Barthel Index on norovirus transmission was similar for transmission to other patients and to healthcare workers. In the weighted analyses, the reproduction number was substantially higher in patients than healthcare workers (1.20 vs. 0.25; mean difference ϭ 0.95 ͓95% CI ϭ 0.60 to 1.30͔) ( Table 2) . This difference was smaller in the unweighted analyses (mean difference ϭ 0.28 ͓95% CI ϭ Ϫ0.28 to 0.84͔). Although the reproduction number for healthcare workers was lower than for patients, the workers could still form a link in the tree to sustain transmission chains. In the first half of the outbreak, the average number of cases attributable to one single infected case was about 6 for both healthcare workers and patients in the unweighted analyses. In the weighted analyses, the average numbers of cases attributable to a single infected patient and an infected healthcare worker were 6.5 and 4.4 (mean difference ϭ 2.1 ͓95% CI ϭ Ϫ4.7 to 8.9͔) ( Table 2 and eAppendix Fig. 1-4 for the distribution of the attributable cases and reproduction number over all generated trees, http://links.lww.com/EDE/A551).
For sensitivity analyses, we changed the weights for contacts and work schedule ( Table 3 ). Weighting the work schedule seemed to be most important in causing differences between reproduction numbers and the attributable cases for patients and healthcare workers. If the work schedule was The Netherlands. The tree is constructed by counting, over all simulated trees, the number of times 2 cases were linked to each other. If a case is linked to one case in one simulated tree, and to another case in another simulated tree, the link that is found most often in all simulated trees is taken here. The thicker the line, the more often this link is found in all transmission trees, and the more likely it is that this was a true transmission. Cases in different wards are indicated by different grayscales. 1 . Epidemic curve of the outbreak of norovirus in a building of a psychiatric institution following a pilgrimage to Lourdes (France) in October/November 2008 in The Netherlands. Cases in different wards are indicated by different grayscales. The epidemic curve is slightly different from the one reported by Rondy and colleagues. 4 One healthcare worker reported symptoms on the first day of the outbreak and on outbreak day 11. In the earlier report, 4 the first outbreak day is taken as the day of symptom onset; however, the healthcare worker did not join the trip to Lourdes and did not work the days before obtaining symptoms, therefore this date of symptom onset could not be linked to the outbreak studied here. As a result, we used the 11th day of the outbreak as the date of symptom onset for this case. According to the room number, the last patient-case is here grouped in ward A but in the study by Rondy and colleagues 4 this person is shown in ward B.
omitted in the sensitivity analyses, differences between patients and healthcare workers were comparable to the baseline unweighted analyses. If mixing between wards was prevented (by setting the corresponding weights to zero), transmission between wards could be achieved only by healthcare workers in the same wing and by patients who were smokers. This resulted in a larger number of attributable cases to a single infected healthcare worker compared with the weighted analyses, and, hence, a smaller difference between healthcare workers and patients (2.5 ͓95% CI ϭ Ϫ0.0 to 5.0͔).
DISCUSSION
The analysis of simulated transmission trees suggests that the main transmission route in this psychiatric institution norovirus outbreak was between patients. The second most important transmission route was patient-to-healthcare worker transmission. The overall reproduction number for patients was higher than for healthcare workers. Patients with a lower Barthel Index had a higher reproduction number, suggesting that healthcare workers had a higher chance of acquiring infection from patients who relied more on help from healthcare workers in their daily activities.
To our knowledge, this is the first time that the level and direction of norovirus transmission between healthcare workers and patients have been quantified. There are, however, limitations to the methods. First, every case is assumed to have been infected by one of the other observed cases, and environmental transmission is not explicitly taken into account. Norovirus has been shown to remain infective for long periods in fomites. 11 A primary case may create a situation where virus is deposited on an inanimate surface and is picked up by a susceptible subject. The risk that the virus will be picked up at any time is given by a hazard function that declines slowly with time since onset of the primary case's symptoms. The corresponding probability density function for time of infection of a susceptible individual is defined by the first time that the susceptible picks up the virus. This probability density function, which is expected to decline much faster than the hazard function, is modeled by the gamma distribution. The long intervals between symptom onsets according to this gamma distribution imply very slowly decaying hazard functions and long infective periods in fomites. It is also possible that uninfected healthcare workers could have helped spread the virus on contaminated 
Unweighted analyses
Weighted analyses 80 P to P P to HCW HCW to P HCW to HCW FIGURE 3. Percentage of transmission subdivided over different transmission routes between patients (P) and healthcare workers (HCW), over all generated trees. The box represents the median and the interquantile range, and the vertical lines represent 1.5 times the interquantile range from the edge of the box. The dots represent the outliers. The unweighted analyses (light gray) assume homogeneous mixing between healthcare workers and patients. The weighted analyses (dark gray) assume mixing between individuals: more within-ward mixing than between-wards (1 vs. 0.2), mixing of healthcare workers with neighboring wards (0.6), and people from different wards mix in smoking area (0.5), plus the work schedule of healthcare workers is implemented.
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Quantifying Norovirus Transmission hands. Patients treated by the same healthcare worker could then infect one another via the healthcare worker, while the healthcare worker escapes infection. This would have overestimated the contribution of patient-to-patient transmission in our study. Second, transmission by asymptomatic shedders was not explicitly taken into account. This is a reasonable assumption because asymptomatic shedders tend to contribute less to transmission than symptomatic shedders. 30 Furthermore, ward A had many symptomatically infected healthcare workers, whereas the other wards had few, but the overall attack rates were not different. If the probability of developing symptoms were lower in infected healthcare workers than in patients, the number of healthcare workers involved in transmission might have been underestimated. However, if the probability of symptoms is similar in infected healthcare workers and patients, ignoring asymptomatic shedders is unlikely to change the conclusions. The number of attributable cases will be higher when asymptomatic infections are included, but the direction of the differences between healthcare workers and patients remains the same. Including asymptomatic shedders is also not expected to affect reproduction numbers because these are calculated as the ratio of the number of secondary cases to the number of primary cases; including asymptomatic infections increases both the numerator and the denominator, thereby canceling out.
Patient-to-patient transmission was shown as the main component in this outbreak. Some support for this conclusion can be found in published literature. For example, norovirus outbreaks starting with a patient have a higher attack rate than outbreaks starting with a healthcare worker. 31 In a recent study of norovirus attack rates in outbreaks with different policies for excluding affected healthcare workers, differences in the exclusion period had little effect on the patient attack rate. 17 Third, a study evaluating different control measures aimed at limiting patient-to-patient, patient-tohealthcare-worker, and healthcare-worker-to-patient transmission in nursing homes reported consistently higher attack rates in patients compared with healthcare workers. 20 Finally, in a norovirus outbreak in a hospital psychiatric ward where most control measures were aimed at limiting patient-topatient transmission, lower attack rates were observed in patients compared with healthcare workers. 32 The low reproduction number for healthcare workers suggests that they did not transmit norovirus as often as a Assumes homogeneous mixing between healthcare workers and patients. b Assumes mixing between individuals according to the following weights: more within-ward mixing than between wards (1 vs. 0.2), mixing of healthcare workers with neighboring wards (0.6), and people from different wards mix in smoking area (0.5); plus the work schedule of healthcare workers was implemented.
c Calculated as the reproduction number in patients minus the reproduction number in healthcare workers. d Calculated as the size of the downstream branch in the transmission tree (including both direct and indirect transmission). e Calculated as the number of cases attributable to an infected patient minus the number of cases attributable to an infected healthcare worker. patients. However, the reproduction number was above zero, and the number of attributable cases was relatively high; therefore, healthcare workers could still be an essential link in the tree, continuing the chain of transmission. These findings are based on a network in which transmission chains of observed cases are linked by inferred infection events, such that every case is linked to one of the other observed cases in the outbreak. Individual-level observations about who had contact with whom were not available. As in any outbreak in a closed setting, depletion of susceptibles ends transmission naturally; the healthcare workers at the end of the transmission chain could not have transmitted norovirus any further. The number of attributable cases might therefore be biased toward less transmission from healthcare workers. To minimize this potential bias, we focused on the first half of the outbreak for this statistic. Additional information about network structure would be needed to perform a counterfactual analysis (ie, to find out what would happen if a particular healthcare worker was removed from the network). In such an analysis, the probability of multiple infectious contacts per case would need to be quantified, with the first contact corresponding to an actual infection event where infection is transmitted to a susceptible person, and later contacts correspond to unobserved (counterfactual) events where infection may be transmitted to someone who was already infected.
The work schedules of healthcare workers are important for understanding norovirus transmission in health facilities. The work schedule affected the results because absence of healthcare workers from work temporarily interrupts transmission completely. Furthermore, because most healthcare workers worked part-time, some transmission links became considerably less likely. The weights assumed in the analyses were based on ratios of contact frequencies considered to be usual practice in the studied institution. The magnitude of the Barthel Index was not used as a weight in the estimation procedure because this would have required additional unverifiable assumptions about the form of the relationship between the Barthel score and intensity of contact and about the weights for transmission contacts between 2 patients with different scores. The sensitivity analyses demonstrated that changing the weights did not alter the conclusions.
This study has implications for future research. There are also other infections transmitted nosocomially, such as MRSA and tuberculosis, 33 for which an improved understanding of the level and direction of transmission would be of value. The method that we developed can be used to quantify the direction of transmission of norovirus between healthcare workers and patients during an outbreak. Applying this method to other outbreaks of norovirus could improve our quantitative understanding of transmission routes be- 
